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Floridi and Taddeo propose a condition of “zero semantic com-
mitment” for solutions to the grounding problem, and a solution to 
it. I argue briefly that their condition cannot be fulfilled, not even 
by their own solution. After a look at Luc Steel’s very different 
competing suggestion, I suggest that we need to re-think what the 
problem is and what role the ‘goals’ in a system play in formulating 
the problem. On the basis of a proper (syntactic) understanding of 
computing, I come to the conclusion that the only sensible ground-
ing problem is how we can explain and re-produce the behavioral 
ability and function of meaning in artificial computational agents.  
1. A traditional symbol grounding problem
The traditional symbol grounding problem suggests that mere syntactic symbol 
manipulation in a computer will never lead to meaning – notoriously formulated 
in John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room argument’ (Searle, 1980). So, how can the sym-
bols in a computational system be ‘grounded’ such that they acquire that causal 
link to their referents?  
Searle in the Chinese room says: I do computation. This is a matter of function 
(computation), not of substance (silicon vs. carbon). He then goes on to argue 
that: 
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1) The symbol manipulator in the Chinese room does not understand Chi-
nese, but just produces correct output; he has no chance of learning 
Chinese  
2) The whole system: central manipulator + manipulation manuals + input-
output system does not understand Chinese, not even if “sensory or-
gans” (cameras, microphones, etc.) are added. All of this supplies “just 
more Chinese.” 
But: 2) does not follow from 1), as many people have pointed out. This does not 
mean that his argument fails, however. The upshot of the argument is, in my 
view, that Searle sets the task to explain how a system can understand Chinese 
given that the central symbol manipulator does not (Müller, 2009). In other 
words, the main argument is really this: 
1. Syntactical manipulation is not sufficient for a system to acquire 
meaning. 
2. A computer does only syntactical manipulation. 
3. A computer will not acquire meaning. 
Searle tries to show that a system could not “think, understand and so on solely 
in virtue of being a computer with the right sort of program” (Searle, 1980, pp. 
§6, 368). 
The traditional challenge that Stevan Harnad has made of this is: How can a 
system (natural or artificial) acquire meaning for their symbols given that the 
central symbol manipulator is merely syntactical? 
 
The resulting situation is a standoff. The philosophers typically say to the AI 
researchers: 
“Our a priori problem is unsolved, so you will not succeed.” 
To which the AI researchers respond: 
“We couldn’t care less and we are doing just fine. (We have a refutation, and 
we might write it up when we find the time.)” 
Of course, this is rather unsatisfactory, so a clarification of the problem like the 
one offered by Floridi is very welcome. We will investigate Floridi’s problem, an 
alternative proposal by Luc Steels (not discussed by Floridi) and offer our own 
proposal for a formulation of the problem. 
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2. Zero semantic commitment 
Grounding is a problem for the philosophy of information since it needs to make 
the move from mere ‘data’ to meaningful information – thus the chapters 6 and 7 
in (Floridi, 2011), based on the papers (Taddeo & Floridi, 2005, 2007). In the fol-
lowing, I will refer to the later book version. 
The problem in Floridi is first explicitly detached from the discussions 
around the Chinese Room and then a proposal for “zero semantic commitment” 
is made, which is a conjunction of three conditions, jointly called the “Z condi-
tion”: 
“a. No form of innatism is allowed; no semantic resources … should be mag-
ically presupposed […] 
b. No form of externalism is allowed either: no semantic resources should be 
uploaded from the 'outside' by some deus ex machina already semantically 
proficient […] 
c. The AA [artificial agent] may have its own capacities and resources”  
(Floridi, 2011, pp. 137-139) 
2.1. Semantics & Goals 
The Z condition immediately strikes me as very strong. One thing that appears a 
minimal requirement (a necessary condition) for semantics is directedness, goal 
orientation of the agent. This looks like a problem for the Z condition, which 
seems to say that an agent cannot be born with directedness (or be externally 
supplied with it), since directedness is a necessary condition for semantics. But 
note that directedness is not also a sufficient condition; so if we do not have se-
mantics (yet), nothing follows on whether we also have directedness in the agent 
as well – but Floridi will make it look like we can’t even have directedness. What 
we really need to know now is what the agent has that allows them to find a 
‘praxical’ solution – something that the mere syntactic system of Searle etc. was 
lacking. 
If, for example, we consider an animal that is trying to survive by finding 
food and shelter, such an animal might develop interaction with other members 
of its species that involves symbols for matters they care about. But notice how 
artificial this consideration is, since we are not assuming such a thing could hap-
pen within a generation, ontogenetically (unless we give in to ‘Chinese Room’ 
fiction of an agent that already has full blown cognitive ability and now tries to 
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develop semantics). So, one real question is how this can happen in a species – 
but this is precisely what the Z condition seems to exclude, since phylogenetic 
developments involve innateness and external semantic resources. 
2.2. Action-based semantics to the rescue 
Let us see what actually happens when a solution is brought to the table. Floridi 
proposes in his ‘action-based semantics’ “the proto-meanings of the symbols 
generated by an AA are the internal states of that AA, which in turn are directly 
correlated to the actions performed by that same AA” (Floridi, 2011, p. 164).  In 
the example of wall-following of a simple device where a sensor is appropriately 
linked to actuators (as in a Breitenberg vehicle) the “purpose of the action has no 
direct influence on the generation of the meaning. No teleosemantics of any sort 
is presupposed. Hence, in AbS there are no extrinsic semantic criteria driving the 
process of meaning generation.” (Floridi, 2011, p. 165). And yet, we are told that 
there is meaning, eventually, unlike in the heliotropic behavior of sunflowers. 
When evaluating this, first note the slide from ‘proto-meaning’ to ‘meaning’ here 
and then how the claim that this device satisfies the Z condition is defended: It 
has no goals that it is trying to achieve, neither built-in nor supplied externally. 
This was a complaint earlier, with competing systems, e.g. with Kismet ((2011, p. 
158) and Rosenstein and Cohen’s ‘Ros’ ((2011, p. 154) – both systems have 
something built-in that makes certain data stand out with respect to others, 
worth to maintain, marking ‘success’. Other systems (e.g. Cangelosi & Riga, 
2006) use a teacher or competent language user to mark ‘success’. The move from 
descriptive to prescriptive language is crucial here: when one solution is better 
than another (more successful), then Floridi steps in and says the Z condition has 
been violated. I agree. 
This brings us back to a dilemma: Either the action-based semantics system 
is successfully building something or it is just like the sunflowers – with “no se-
mantic resources at all” (p. 164), with no meaning or proto-meaning. Without 
goals, there is no ‘trying’, nothing is ‘better’, and there is no ‘success’. Either the 
system really is an agent (Floridi speaks about an “artificial agent”, an “AA”), 
which implies having goals, or it is just a system that interacts with its environ-
ment – without goals. 
We are told that the two-machine AA with its two level architecture (object-
level and meta-level) is “able to associate symbols to the actions that it performs” 
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(p. 166), but under what conditions would it actually do this? What would make 
that association a symbol? 
It appears that having a semantics implies normativity, since without norma-
tivity we do not have the ‘right or wrong’ use of symbols, the ‘failure or success’ 
or referring, etc. Note, however, that the reverse does not hold, since even a 
purely syntactic system seems to require normativity: the three elementary no-
tions of syntactical systems are that of the ‘well-formed formula’, ‘rules of deri-
vation’ and ‘axioms’. Also, there are natural systems that have goals and thus 
normativity but no semantics – most biological systems are like that, e.g. plants, 
protozoa, etc. 
We seem thrown back to fairly elementary questions like what is that ‘mean-
ing’ or ‘semantics’ that the system is supposed to ground and why should it do 
such a thing. What is the problem we are trying to solve? In order to get a better 
grip on this problem, allow me a look at a competing proposal. 
3. Steels cutting the Gordian knot (nomen est omen) 
Luc Steels’ paper, ‘The symbol grounding problem has been solved, so what’s 
next?’ (Steels, 2008) states at the outset that “almost 25 years of philosophical 
discussion have shed little light on the issue... However, I believe that sufficient 
progress has been made in cognitive science and AI so that we can say that the 
symbol grounding problem has been solved” (Steels, 2008, p. 223). He declines 
any invitation to participate in the philosophers’ game of disentangling the prob-
lem, but instead wields a large sword to cut through the knot. Nomen est omen, 
when ‘Steels’ swings the blade, and a few heads might be rolling too, if in the 
way.  
His sword is a particular version of interactive robotics. Is it sharp enough 
and does it cut the knot? 
Here is what he says: “Let me return now to the question originally posed 
by Searle (1980): can a robot deal with grounded symbols? More precisely, is it 
possible to build an artificial system that has a body, sensors and actuators, signal 
and image processing, pattern recognition processes, and information structures 
to store and use semiotic networks [btw. objects, symbols and concepts], and 
uses all that for communicating about the world or representing information 
about the world.” (226) – Of course, at this point, the philosopher responds with 
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a self-assured smile and begins to explain that this was not Searle’s original ques-
tion. But is this philological correction sufficient? 
“A first prerequisite for solving the symbol grounding problem is that we 
can work with physically embodied autonomous agents, … they move and be-
have without any remote control or further human intervention once the exper-
iment starts.” (236) - [I.e. we do not put in the meaning – though we put in abili-
ties.] 
This seems right, we now have all the fashionable items: situated, embodied, 
perception-motor coupled, interactive. What else do we want? 
Is this not pretty much what one of my former selves had demanded for nat-
ural (human) grounding? “Our claim is that the causal connection between the 
nonconceptual content of the object-files and the world provides causal chains 
that solve the grounding problem and overcome some of the problems associated 
with causal accounts of reference.” (Raftopoulos & Müller, 2006, p. 254)  
3.1. Cutting the knot is not disentangling it (the philosophers’ temp-
tation) 
We should point out that this interactive robot is just a ‘purely syntactic device’ 
like the ones Searle is attacking. There is no indication how ‘understanding’ 
should arise. The aim is externally defined ‘communicative success’ –  ‘success’ to 
whom? (Note the implied normativity.) The success is achieved by the ‘right’ 
settings of the devices by the programmers – so it is externally introduced. We 
should admit that the system partially models the function of linguistic commu-
nication, but a model of lactation does not produce milk! So, it does not look like 
we made any progress at all. 
4. Summary: Grounding pseudo-problems 
It appears that there are several problems here that are ‘grounding problems’ and 
not all of them deserve philosophical attention or engineering solutions. Allow 
me to list a few, not aiming for completeness: 
1. If cognition is computation over symbols, then we need grounded sym-
bols before we can start. 
2. We want a system that generates meaningful symbols (‘semantics’) but 
has no goals, neither innate nor external 
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3. We want to find the right settings for the right behavior that links lin-
guistic symbols to object types 
4. We want to understand how some species could develop semantics 
(phylogenetically) 
5. We want to make a system with meaning in it, on the basis of a syntactic 
computation device with sensors and actuators 
I would suggest that only the last two of these problems can be solved – but not 
by philosophers. Perhaps there is really a hard and an easy problem here. Let me 
explain:  
5. The hard and the easy problem of symbol grounding 
5.1. D. Chalmers’s two problems of consciousness 
Chalmers famously proposed that there are two problems of consciousness, 
namely: 
Hard Problem: Why and how does physics give rise to conscious experience 
(to phenomenal consciousness, to ‘what it is like’)? (Chalmers, 1995; cf. 
Chalmers, 1996) 
Easy Problem: “explanation of cognitive abilities and functions” of awareness 
(the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus 
attention, etc) – computational or neural mechanisms. 
As Chalmers adds: “What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is 
that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. ... Why is the 
performance of these functions accompanied by experience?” (Chalmers, 1995, p. 
sect. 3) 
I want to suggest that there is an analogous set of problems in grounding. 
5.2. The easy problem of symbol grounding 
“How can we explain and re-produce the behavioral ability and function of 
meaning [and other intentional phenomena] in artificial computational agents?” 
To this problem, we already have some answers: 
− Classical AI: Any way that works is a good way (ignoring function). 
− Steels: We did it! (The suitably constructed computational mechanism 
acquires a semantic network in interaction with other such mechanisms.) 
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− E. DiPaolo (Di Paolo, Rohde, & De Jeogher, 2010): None of these sys-
tems have any intentional states, desires. They don’t have a life! (A pre-
carious one.) Thus, they do not have the right functional architecture, 
the right causal connections.  
5.3. The hard problem of symbol grounding 
“How does physics give rise to meaning [and other intentional phenom-
ena]?” 
A solution to this problem requires behavioral ability in a functional architecture 
and the right kind of inner mechanism. The experience of understanding is an 
elementary part of what we call ‘understanding’. (For Searle, to mean what I say 
is trying to get someone else to recognize my intentions.) The hard problem di-
rectly involves conscious experience, i.e. it involves solving the hard problem of 
consciousness and might be an ill-formed problem if the respective problem of 
consciousness is one. - This problem is untouched by evolutionary robotics. 
6. Back to the easy problem! 
The only problem I see here that has any urgency is the ‘easy problem’: 
“How can we explain and re-produce the behavioral ability and function 
of meaning [and other intentional phenomena] in artificial [mainly] 
computational agents?” 
We should get the best cognitive science and go for it! 
My suspicion is that Floridi is not tackling the easy problem, but I am not 
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